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The rise of newly industrializing countries  U.S. deficit, the hi-open, global growth strategy
(NICs) and potential NICs in several regions of  moves toward improved trade balances in all
the world has given the world economy a new  blocs as exports and imports increase together.
structure which must be corsidered in anticipat-  The hi-open strategy moves toward better
ing future trends.  balance among industrial countries, adaptation
In this multipolar world economy, more  of the rest of the OECD to further integration of
openness to trade and more expansionary  the European Community, incorporation of the
policies in more key countries - including  socialist economies into world trade, and ame-
developing and socialist economies - can  lioration of the world debt problem.
significantly affect the magnitude and rates of  The hi-open scenario generates US$2.4
growth of world GDP and trade.  .Allion  more world GDP in 10 years (1985-95)
In this report, Bradford analyzes three  than the lo-closed scenario, and US$1.4 trillion
scenarios of (strategies for) world trade:  more in exports.  It generates US$1.6 trillion
- The base case scenario - the current  more GDP than the base case scer  io, and
(intra-OECD) policy, which is on a trajectory of  US$870 billion more in exports.
moderate growth.  The model for this scenario  Under the hi-open strategy, if Eastem
produces continuing trade imbalances, especially  Europe and the Soviet Union fail to expand and
for the United States and Japan, but also for  open their economies, export growth rates in
other non-OECD blocs.  1985-95 wiU  be dampened in eight of the 12
* The lo-closed  scenario - more closed, less  core blocs.  This is a powerful argument for
trade intensive, with a lower growth path.  In  opening world trade to the Soviet bloc so that
this scenario, world export growth is more  the Soviet bloc will open up to the rest of the
sensitive to decreases in openness (as measured  world.
by the import-GDP ratio) than to decreases in  Bradford's simulations quantitatively show
projected GDP growth rates.  Policy conclusion:  how important it is for the EC to open up to the
sustaining the import capacity and openness of  rest of the world, to compensate for the inevi-
the 36 countries in the three OECD and nine  table deflection of EC demand (under EC 92)
NIC blocs is crucial to sustaining world trade  from non-European markets to other EC econo-
growth.  mies.
* The hi-open (global growth) scenario-  The growth prospects of the lower income
more open, higher growth, more global trade  countries neither affect nor are affected by the
patterns.  Simultaneous expansion of the 12  36 motor economies. There is no automatic
major blocs would assure export growth.  Favor-  trickle-down of growth through trade.  Nor is
able export growth prospects are vital to the  there a self-interested economic rationale as
growth pattern on which this strategy depends,  there is if the Soviet Union and Eastem Europe
in which imports grow faster than GDP.  open up to world trade (in which case, the
Unlike the expansion of surplus economies  dynamic economies benefit directly from
(Germany, Japan) as a means of correcting the  increased growth in the socialist countries).
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I.  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS
1.  The central  organizing  principle  and  hypothesis of  this  paper  is that  intra-OECD
interactions do not constitute sufficient explanations of world economic outcomes. The rise of
the NICs in several regions results in a new structure of the world economy which must be
taken into account in anticipating future trends.  The trade model developed in this paper has
twelve core blocs, three OECD blocs and nine NIC or potential NIC blocs.  The nine NIC blocs
together consist of thirty six countries that account for 75 percent of world trade.  In addition,
there are four b'.ocs  of impacted countries.
2.  The nine NiC or potential NIC blocs are: the four East Asian NICs, the four South
East Asian next tier NICs, the three large Latin American NICs, the three Southern European
countries who have joined the enlarged EC, six Eastern European NICs or potential NICs, four
Mediterranean economies  (Turkey, Yugoslavia,  Israel and Egypt), and India, China and the
Soviet Union.  The four impacted blocs are: the highly indebted countries (HICs), the oil
exporting countries (OPEC), twenty-eight lower income countries (LICs), and the rest of the
world.
3.  The model postulates alternative assumptions  about the GDP growth, the openness,
and the tr,de  strategies of the twelve core blocs and generates future export growth paths for
each core and impacted bloc.  Simulations using the model show that the growth rates, openness
and trade strategies of the nine NIC blocs make a significant difference in global outcomes.
Secondly,  export growth paths are highly sensitive to assumptions  about the degree of openness
(the import-GDP share) of the twelve major blocs.  Thirdly, the model highlights the
interconnectedness of major global economic issues and the interdependence of trading blocs in
determining world economic outcomes. And finally, applying a global growth strategy rather
than an intra-OECD current policy path, the model generates world export and GDP outcomes-2-
which  are decidedly  greater  in magnitude  than  the outcomes  which one  would  expect  to follow
from  a current  policy course  for  the  world economy.
4.  The  fundamental  difference  between  the global strategy  outcomes and  the current
policy outcomes  is that in  practice  the degree  of openness  to imports  is determined  by  the
expected  path  of export  growth.  Expansionary  import  demand  will not manifest  itself  if  export
prospects  are  poor.  A modest  world economic  growth  outlook translates  into bleak  export
prospects  which  inevitably  means more constrained  macroeconomic  policies and  more  restricted
imports.  Such an outlook  becomes a self-fulfilling  prophecy.
5.  A  global strategy  breaks  this  logic  by demonstrating  that  export  promotion  strategies
by  major  blocs vis-a-vis  each other  can fuel higher  economic  growth provided  that  import
demand  is expanded  and  higher  import-GDP  shares  are achieved  in all major  blocs.
Specifically,  if  the U.S. and  Latin America  maintain  their  import-GDP  share into  the mid-1990s
in  the expectation  that  a more  robust  world  economy will yield  export-GDP  shares of  roughly
the same magnitude,  if Japan,  the  East Asian  NICs and  Next Tier  Asia move their  import-GDP
shares up  to  their export-GDP  shares,  if  the socialist bloc and  India  open up  to world  trade  on
both  the  import  and  the export  side,  if the  three  European  blocs raise  their  aggregate  import-
GDP  share while  achieving  closer integration  among themselves  and  if  more cross regional  trade
is realized  among  the various  blocs, then  world export  and  GDP  outcomes shift  outward  to an
extent  they  would  not in the absence of  a global strategy.
6.  It is the  interdependence  of the  expanded  number  of important  trading  blocs and
maintaining  or increasing  their  openness which  provides  the dynamic  shift  in results.  The key
element  is that  import  exmansion will not occur unless the  prosiects  are credible  that  extort
strateRies will  yav  off.  Each  bloc stands  to eain orovidinp  all  blocs commit  to an ex2ansionarv
growth  oath.
7.  Whereas it is difficult  to see how  to manage solutions to major  world economic
problems  taken  in isolation,  a global strategy  approach  poses the possibility  of addressing  and
alleviating  several  major  problems  simultaneously  U.S. - Japan  imbalances,  Latin American  and
HIC debt,  protectionism  against NIC exports,  the opening  of the socialist countries  to the market
economies,  and  the absorption  by the  U.S., Japan  and  the NICs of the effects  of further
European  integration  are each alleviated  and  facilitated  by  the simultaneous  economic  expansion-3-
and  trade  strategy  behavior  embodied  in a global growth strategy  of the sort  outlined  in the
paper.
8.  Other  significant  conclusions  are:
*  Withdrawing  from  the  global strategy  the opening  by  the Soviet Union  and
Eastern  Europe  to trade  with  market  economies  (and the  higher GDP  growth
and  trade  strategy  shifts  by  these two blocs expected  to accompany  their  greater
openness),  reduces  the export  growth  rates of  the U.S., Japan,  the four
Mediterranean  economies,  Latin America,  East  Asia and  next  tier  Asia by an
average  of a  half a  percentage  point  per  year  over  ten  years.  China and  India
lose an average of  1.0 and  2.7 percentage  points,  respectively,  in their  export
growth  rates  due  to the absence  of the opening  of the Soviet Union  and  Eastern
Europe  in the  global strategy  scenario.
*  This  result shows that  the core  OECD and  NIC  blocs have  a significant  stake  in
the opening  of  the Soviet Union and  Eastern  Europe  toward  them.  This  result
follows  from  the fact  that  the size of the Soviet Union  is 13 percent  of world
GDP  (compared  to 9 percent  for  Japan,  for  example)  and  the six  Eastern
European  economies  are another  4 percent  of world GDP  (about  the size of the
three  large  Latin  American  economies).  This  result creates  a nowerful  economic
araument  in the  West for  oQening to the  Soviet bloc as a means of encouraging
the opening  of  the Soviet bloc  to the rest  of the world.
*  Isolating  the absence  of European  integration  from  the global strategy  scenario
illustrates  that  the main  beneficiaries  of  EC enlargement  and  integration  are  the
seven core  EC economies,  Spain,  Portugal and  Greece  and  the four
Mediterranean  economies.  (See list of countries  by  bloc  in the Appendix).-4-
o  The simulations show the inmortance of EC integration to the European blocs
and the importance of EC openness to the non-Euronean blocs.  If tha three
European blocs raised their import-GDP shares without further integration
among themselves, the main beneficiaries would be the U.S., Japan, the NICs,
Latin America and the HICs.  An increased proportion of trade within the larger
European market necessarily means decreased European import shares for their
major non-European trade partners.  This loss in demand for non-European
exports can be partially offset by higher import-GDP shares by the European
blocs.
*  The twenty eight lower income countries (LICs) (twenty four African and four
South Asian economies) make almost no difference in the world economic
outcomes.  Major changes in GDP growth rates for the LICs make negligible
differexices  in results for other blocs.
*  Similarly,  significant  differences  in economic  growth scenarios  for  the  twelve
core blocs have a relatively small impact on the export and GDP growth rates of
the LICs.
*  One concludes that despite the emergence of new powers in world economic
growth, some of which are developing countries, this more multi-polar world
economy continues to be highly polarized. The erowth prosPects of the lower
income countries neither affects nor is affected by the thirty-six motor
economies. There is no automatic trickle-down of growth through trade which
will decisively improve the prospects of the poorest countries of Africa and
South Asia.  Deliberate policy measures by them and by the key economies will
be necessary.- 5  -
IL.  MODELING  FUTURE  PATTERNS  OF WORLD TRADE
A.  The Model
9.  The  trade  model  used to address  aq  --r issues facing  the  world  economy and  to
simulate  alternative  future  patterns  of tracde  aitd growth consists  of three  OECD blocs,  nine  NIC
blocs,  three  impacted  developing  country  blocs and  the rest  of the  world.  (See the  Appendix  for
details  regarding  the country  groupings  in each bloc.)  The model has three  exogenous  variables:
the  average annual  GDP  growth  for  each bloc for  the  1985-1995  period;  the import-GDP  share
projected  for  each bloc  in  1995; and  the percentage  of total imports  by  each bloc from  each bloc
(the import  coefficient).  Alternative  assumptions  about  relat  e rates  of GDP  growth,  degrees of
openness and  shifts  in the  structure  of trade  relations  between  blocs constitute  the  instrument
ariables.  These three  exogenous  variables  generate  the alternative  endogenous  outcomes
consisting  of average  annual export  growth rates  for  the  1985-1995 period  and  export-GDP
shares for  each bloc  in  1995.  (The equations  of the  model can be found  in the Appendix).
10.  The export  outcomes are induced  by the exogenous  variables  run  through  a  sixteen-
by-sixteen  trade  matrix.  The columns of the  matrix  contain  the  import  coefficients  which are
the  percentage  of  total  imports  by each bloc  from each bloc.  The columns  are the  import
demand  dimension  of  the model.  The rows of the matrix  are  the supply  dimension  of the model
showing the  exports  of each bloc to each bloc.  The sum of the columns equals total  imports;  the
sum of each row equals  total exports.  The cells in the columns divided  by total  imports  give  the
import  coefficients.  The cells in the rows divided  by total  exports  3ives the structure  of
exports.  The diagonals are intra-bloc  trade  in a percentage  of total  trade.
11.  The matrix  of trade  flows for  1985 is used to derive  the  matrix  of import  coefficients
used as initial  structure  of world  trade  for  the projection  period  1985 to  1995.  The  1985 base
year  data  was the only year  for  which complete  data was available  at  the  time  the model was
built.  The  year  1985 provides  a structure  of world  trade  at the  peak of the  strong  dollar  and as
a result  amplifies  the  importance  of the  U.S. import stimulus  to the  world economy
characteristic  of that  .-6-
B.  The  ReRional Patterns  of Trade
12.  The degree  of regionalization  of  the world economy  is clearly  evident  ih  the  import
coefficients  in  the  1985 trade  matrix.  (See Table  I).  There  is a high concentration  of  trade
betw3en Latin  America  and  the United  States,  within  Western Europe  broadly  defined,  within
the Soviet bloc and  in the  Pacific  Basin.  For example,  in  1985 42 percent  of  Latin America's
imports  came from  the  U.S. and  44 percent  of Latin  American  exports  went to the  U.S.  This is
after  "a progressive  disentanglement  of  Latin  America  fromn  the North  A.merican  econenm, in
trade  in the recent  past".  (Bitar,  1987 p.8).
13.  The patterns  of  regionalization  in  Europe  nre not surprising.  Fully  half of EC7 trade
(both imports  and  exports)  is within  the EC7 groui.  The  EC7 is also the dominant  export
market  for  the  ECMed  and  the NonECMed4  with 51 percent  of ECMed exports  and  34 percent
of NonECMed  exports  going to the EC7 compared  with  interactions  between  and  among  the
ECMed and  NonECMed  co-intries  ranging  between  I and  4 percent  of  imports  and exports.
Despite  the  fact  that  between  43 and  37 percent,  respectively,  of ECMed and  NonECMed
imports  come  from  the EC7, they  only amount  to 6 percent  of EC7 exports.
14.  The Soviet Union  and  Eastern  Europe  are as highly  interdependent  in trade  as the
EC7.  The Soviet Union  exports  half  its total exports  to the six  Eastern  European  countries  and
imports  half  its total  imports  from  them.  The EE6 import  half their  total  imports  from  the
Soviet Union  and  export  40 percent  of  their exports  to the  Soviet Union.  Twenty  percent  of
EE6  trade  is intra-Eastern  European  trade,  13 percent  of Soviet imports  and  12 percent  of  EE6
imports  come  from  the EC7 but this  trade  only amounts to a total  of 4 percent  of total  EC7
exports.  To summarize,  the  main  channels for  trade  in Europe  are among  the  EC7 and  between
the Soviet Union  and  the  EE6 with  considerable  trade  (20 percent)  among  the EE6.  The  spill
over from  these main  channels  is not large  based on  the  1985 trade  matrix.
15.  Much  attention  has been  focused  recently  on the  dynamism  of the  Pacific  Basin.  The
matrix  of tr^de  interactions  within  the  Pacific  Basin shows that the  East  Asian NICs,  Next Tier
Asia (NTA),  and  China  import  65 percent  of their  total imports  from  each other  and  the United
States and  Japan  combined  (Table  II).  Japan,  the  NICs, NTA  and  China export  between  63 and
77 percent  of their  total  exports  within  the region.  Japan  imports  only half  (48 percent)  of its
imports  from  within  the  Pacific  Basin.  (Twenty  percent  of Japanese  imports  are from  OPEC-7-
whereas only 8 percent of Japanese imports come from EC7, ECM, NECM, EE and the Soviet
Union combined.)  The United States imports 36 percent of its imports from Pacific Basin
countries while only 22 percent of U.S. exports go to the region.  In Pacific Asia, roughly two
thirds of Pacific Basin trade occurs within the region, with the exception of Japanese imports.
This is at once a powerful and relatively self contained source of ecnnomic growth.
16.  The 1985 trade matrix manifests a broad pattern of regionalization in world trade.
The dominant flows are within the European Community, between the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe, within the Pacific Basin, and between Latin America and the United States. Qpe maior
auestion facing the world community is whether the trade and economic growth possibilities that
follow from these regionalized natterns are as beneficial for the world economy as a more
globalized Datpern  of world trade.  The trade model put forward in this paper allows us to
explore the impact of alternative trade patterns for the world economy.Table 1  Trade Matrix  1985
STRUCTURE  OF IMPORT  SOURCES  (1986)
(Percentages  of  Tatal  Block  Imports)
USA  Japan  EC  ECuED  NECMED LAT3  NICs  N.T.Asia E.Eur  USSR  China  India  HICsO  OPEC*  LICs  Rest.
USA  0.210  0.080  0.080  0.160  0.420  0.150  0.144  0.009  0.040  0.130  0.103  0.170  0.200  0.104  0.235
Japan  0.210  0.030  0.030  0.034  0.050  0.220  0 204  0.007  0.040  0.380  0.102  0.03  0.120  0.095  0.076
EC  0.180  0.060  0.610  0.430  0.374  0.120  0.100  0.120  0.120  0.130  0.130  0.264  0.304  0.320  0.2S0  0.331
ECMED  0.010  0.004  0.030  0.020  0.030  0.010  0.005  0.004  0.006  0.010  0.010  0.010  0.025  0.025  0.008  0.015
NECMED  0.010  0.004  0.020  0.010  0.025  0.002  0.005  0.002  0.030  0.050  0.003  0.003  0.007  0.030  0.007  0.009
LAT3  0.080  0.030  0.020  0.060  0.020  0.060  0.006  0.009  0.010  0.020  0.030  0.020  0.062  0.030  0.010  0.014
NICs  0.110  0.094  0.020  0.020  0.010  0.006  0.080  0.230  0.001  0.004  0.130  0.071  0.038  0.049  0.070  0.038
N.T.Asia  0.030  0.180  0.010  0.003  0.006  0.006  0.110  0.054  0.002  0.006  0.010  0.010  0.014  0.009  0.030  0.009
E.Eur  0.006  0.003  0.020  0.020  0.070  0.020  0.001  0.006  0.210  0.480  0.040  0.020  0.040  0.030  0.020  0.029
USSR  0.001  0.010  0.026  0.020  0.020  0.00  0.002  0.003  O.  0.030  0.090  0.015  0.010  0.090  0.046
China  0.007  0.050  0.004  0.002  0.007  0.010  0.080  0.030  0.0a9) 0.020  0.003  0.010  0.007  0.030  0.009
India  0.005  0.010  0.003  0.004  0.003  0.000  0.002  0.003  0.002  0.015  0.001  0.001  0.007  0.010  0.002
HIC**  0.040  0.010  0.020  0.040  0.008  0.080  0.020  0.003  0,020  0.003  0.009  0.020  0.040  0.010  0.006  0.02S
OPEC.  0.020  0.210  0.050  0.160  0.120  0.170  0.180  0.100  0.020  0.005  0.003  0.200  0.107  0.040  0.120  0.030
LICs  0.002  0.005  0.005  0.004  0.004  0.001  0.004  0.004  0.002  0.003  0.003  0.010  0.004  0.008  0.030  0.003
Rest.  0.296  0.16s  0.164  0.104  0.110  0.070  0.088  0.086  0.C02  0.176  0.097  0.079  0.102  0.099  0.108  0  132
SUBTOT.  0.705  0.836  0.846  0.896  0.890  0.930  0.912  0.914  0.938  0.824  0.903  0.921  o.m  0.901  0.892  0.868
710  0.830  0.848  0.903  0.891  0.930  0.916  0.916  0.939  0.82S  0.909  0.926  o.898  0.895  0.890  O.f*9
STRUCTURE  1W EXP?  . MARKETS  (1985)
(Percentages  of  :-.*l  Block  Exports)
USA  Japan  EC  ECUED  NECMED  LAT3  NJCa  N.T.Asia  E.Eur  USSR  China  India  HICs.  OPEC*  LICs  Rest.
USA  0.110  0.200  0.020  0.030  0.080  0.070  0.020  0.004  0.010  0.020  0.008  0.025  0.040  0.009  0.364
Japan  0.880  0.100  0.008  0.008  0.010  0.130  0.040  0.003  0.020  0.080  0.009  0.010  0.060  0.010  0.132
EC  0.100  0.010  0.490  0.030  0.030  0.008  0.020  O.DO7  0.020  0.016  0.008  0.007  0.010  0.060  0.008  0.177
ECMED  0.100  0.010  0.610  0.030  0.030  0.010  0.010  0.005  0.010  0.020  0.020  O.OOS  0.030  0.060  0.004  0.145
NECMED  0.110  0.010  0.340  0.020  0.040  0.003  0.020  0.002  0.090  0.130  0.003  0.002  0.010  0.120  O.041  0.096
LAT3  0.440  O.060  0.160  0.060  0.010  0.030  0.010  0.DOS  0.010  0.030  0.020  O.OOS  0.040  0.050  0.003  0.077
NICs  0.370  0.110  0.100  0.007  0.006  0.002  0.080  0.080  0.001  0.003  0.050  0.010  0.010  0.040  0.010  0.121
N.T.Asia  0.180  0.310  0.110  0.003  0.005  0.005  0.230  0.340  0.004  0.008  0.010  0.003  0.003  0.020  0.010  0.059
E.Eur  0.020  0.004  0.140  0.010  0.030  0.008  0.001  0.002  0.210  0.3^0 0.020  0.003  0.005  0.040  0.004  0.113
USSR  0.005  0.010  0.180  0.010  0.010  0.003  0.002  0.1301  0.520  0.010  0.020  0.005  0.010  0.020  0.194
China  0.085  0.220  0.077  0.00o  0.010  0.017  0.316  0.940  0.040  0.040  0.002  0.003  0.020  0.020  0.107
India  0.230  0.130  0.210  0.020  0.010  0.001  0.030  O.(10  0.020  0.130  0.002  0.003  0.100  0.020  0.084
"IC*e  0.250  0.040  0.270  0.030  0.009  0.040  0.030  0.'306  0.040  0.060  0.005 0.006  0.030  0.020  0.003  0.162
OPEC*  0.190  0.180  0.220  0.050  0.030  0.040  0.090  0.420  0.010  0.003  0.001  0.020  0.014  0.026  0.010  0.097
LIC*  0.100  0.070  0.380  0.020  0.020  0.004  0.050 0.020  0.020  0.030  C  I  U.020  0.014  0.110  0.070  0.112
Rest.  0.320  0.063  0.283  0.016  0.016  0.009  0.030  0.O10  0.017 0.040  6  0.004  0.010  0.027  0.007  0.139
Source:  United  Nations  (COMTRADE)
Methodology:  Figures  represent  Total  Value  of Trade  from  and  to all :ountries  grouped  into  blocks. The original  figures  are in  current  dollars.-9  -
Fable II:  Pacific  Basin
IMPORTS BY
U.S.  Japan  NIC  NTA  China
FROM
U.S.  --  21  15  14  13
Japan  21  --  22  20  38
NIC  11  9  8  23  13
NTA  3  13  1  1  5  1
China  1  5  8  3  --
Total  36  48  64  65  65%
EXPQRTS  AT
U.S.  Japan  NIC  NTA  China  Total
FROM
U.S.  --  I 1  7  2  2  22%
Japan  38  --  13  4  8  63
NIC  37  11  8  8  5  69
NTA  18  31  23  4  1  77
China  9  22  32  4  --  67- 10 -
C.  Alternative  Scenarios
17.  Sets of  three  alternative  scenarios  are  presented  here.  The  middle  or base case
scenario  in  each set assumes that  the structure  of world  trade  remains  static through  1995.  The
regionalized  patterns  just  discussed  would continue  into the  mid-1990s  under  this  base case
scenario.  Furthermore,  import-GDP  shares for  1985 are assumed to  prevail  into the  mid-1990s
as well so that present  imbalances  would be expected  to continue  into the future.  For the  U.S.
and Japan,  at  least,  some detailed  work at  the World Bank suggests the extension  of the  "current
policy'  scenarios  in each country  is highly likely.  (Watkins 1988 and  Park  1988)  Of  the  three
exogenous  variables  that  drive  the trade  model, only GDP  growth  rates are  varied  in  the base
case scenario.  Our  base case is developed  with reference  to the World Bank Base Case for
1987-95 in the  1988 World Develonment  Report.  The World Bank Base Case growth  rate
projections  for  1987-95 are as follows:
GDP GROWTH  1987-95
Industrial  Countries  2.3
Exporters  of  Manufactures  5.0
Highly  Indebted  Countries  3.2
Oil Exporters  2.7
Low Income  Countries  5.4
Source  World Bank  World Develooment
Renort  1988, p. 37.
18.  On either  side of the  base case scenario,  there  are two alternatives:  a lower  growth,
more closed economy scenario  in which  import-GDP  shares decline  in all blocs relative  to  their
1985 levels but the structure  of trade  remains  the same as in  1985 and  a higher  growth,  more
open  economy scenario  in which  import-GDP  shares increase  relative  to their  1985 levels and  in
addition  the  structure  of trade  changes to become less regionalized.
19.  These scenarios  vermit  a comoarison  of a static  moderate  growth traiectorv  (the base
case) with  a more closed,  less trade  intensive,  lower  growth  vath (lo-closed)  with a  more open.
hiBher growth,  more  globalized  trade  gattern  (hi-ooen).  The elements  of these strategies  go
hand  in  hand.  If, for  example,  the  United  States is only able to achieve  trade  balance  by- 11  -
reducing  its import-GDP  share  to its export-GDP  share,  this  would entail  a reduction  in the
U.S. import-GDP  share  from  13 percent  of GDP  in  1985 to 8 percent  of GDP  in  1995.  Since
38 percent  of Japanese exports  went to the U.S. in  1985, a  reduction  in the U.S. import-GDP
share would  be expected  to bring  down  Japanese exports  which  might  also bring  with  it a
proportionate  reduction  in the  import-GDP  share as well.  European  integration  increases  intra-
European  trade  as a share of total  EC7 and  ECMed trade  but  the fortress  Europe  concept  in a
slower growth  world  economy lowers slightly  total  import-GDP  shares in the  three  Eurepean
blocs in this scenario.  Less import  demand  by  the U.S., Japan,  and Europe  would slow the
growth and  hence  import  demand  in their  trading  partners  causing  import-GDP  shares  to drop
in the other  blocs and  GDP  growth rates  to decline  world-wide.  (See Table  III  with  the import-
GDP  shares  for  the  three  scenarios  and  the export-GDP  shares for  1985 to correspond  to the
base case  import-GDP  shares.)
20.  In the hi-open  scenario,  for example  the  U.S. attempts  closing its trade  deficit  by
1995 by increasing  its export-GDP  share  toward  its import-GDP  share of  13 percent.  A maior
question is under what set of assumptions ?bout degrees of ovenness. growth, and changes in
trading  natterns  will make such an outcome  feasible  for  the United  States economy.
(Experimental  simulations  showed  that  increasing  the import-GDP  share  to  15 percent  left  the
U.S. trade  deficit  at 4 percent  of GDP.)  The commonplace  solution  to the  U.S. policy problem
is to advocate  a further  opening  of the Japanese  economy to imports  and  a coordinated  stimulus
package  of growth  policies in Japan  and Germany  to spur  U.S. exports.  In the  hi-open  case, the
import-GDP  share  for  Japan  in  1995 is raised to the  level of its export-GDP  share  in  1985
(17 percent),  which  is a four  percentage  point  GDP share  increase  in its import  share.  In this
scenario,  European  integration  is expected  to increase  EC7 GDP growth  substantially  and  to
enable  the import-GDP  share  to rise.
21.  Most studies  in the last several  years have  found  the gains from  U.S.-Japan-German
coordination  to lack sufficient  growth  and  trade  gains to warrant  or compel  governments  to
actually  coordinate  their  monetary  and fiscal  policies for  growth  objectives.  This  dead-end
suggests trying  to integrate  the  working  out of the U.S. trade  imbalance  with other  structural
changes  in non-OECD  blocs to see to what extent  these shifts  might  generate  patterns  of trade
and  growth  that  would ameliorate  the  U.S. imbalance  but provide  gains for other  blocs,  regions
and  countries  as well.  The opening  of the socialist bloc to trade  with  the rest  of the  world,  the
maintenance  of openness in Latin  America  despite  the debt  problem  and  in East  Asia despite  the- 12 -
threat  of protectionism,  and  the globalization  of trade  patterns  through  deliberate  strategies  to
seek export  markets  and  import  sources  outside  the  normal regional  channels,  taken  together
with  the OECD adjustments  already  postulated,  could provide  a set of mutually  beneficial  global
growth and  trade  gains.
22.  The imoort  demand  of the East  Asian NICs.  Next Tier  Asia.  the  Latin  America  three.
ECMed and  NonECMed.  Eastern  Europe.  the Soviet Union.  China,  and  India  taken  together
accounted  for  26 Dercent of  U.S.exoorts.  31 Dercent of Japanese  exports.  and  16 Dercent of EC7
total  exvorts  in  1985.  These new players or potential  trade  powers  (NICs in  the broadest  sense)
have  a possible global stimulus  role to play  through  their size,  growth,  openness,  trade
promotion  policies and  import  sourcing  strategies.  The hi-open  scenario  combines  OECD
adjustment  patterns  with  the  increased openness  in non-OECD  blocs with  globalization  strategies
in all  blocs.  The assumptions  about  the degree  of openness  for  each bloc are shown  in Table  III.
It  remains  to specify  the trade  strategies  of each bloc.




Lo-Closed  (1985)  Hi-Open  (1985)
USA  8  13  13  8
Japan  11  13  17  17
EC  28  30  35  32
ECMED  20  22  26  23
NECMED  23  25  27  23
LAT3  5  7  10  14
NICS  45  49  54  54
N.T.Asia  24  26  30  29
E.Europe  15  18*  20  17
USSR  5  7*  10  7
China  7  12  12  8
India  7  10  12  6
HICS  16  16  16  20
OPEC  18  18  20
LICS  22  22  22  15
Notes:  *  CEPII  (Chelem)
Source:  ANDREX  (GDP  Shares calculated  from  data in  1980$)- 13 -
D.  Trade  Strateaies  in  the Hi-QOen  Scenario
23.  Countries  have  trade  strategies  for a  variety of  economic  and  political reasons.  Import
sourcing  decisions  and  export  marketing  programs  are targeted  on  certain  countries  or regions
where  the greatest  overall  gain  is anticipated.  Size, dynamism,  stability,  and  the  long term
outlook  all play  a role.  The  potential  of gaining  an investment  presence  or export  penetration  in
a market  can influence  import  sourcing  strategies,  and  vice versa.  Security  considerations,
macroeconomic  interactions,  and  political  relations  influence  trade  policies.  Whereas monetary
and  fiscal  policies,  exchange  rate  dynamics,  and other  economic  variables  would be expected  to
heavily  influence  the  trade  balance,  trade  policies would  be expected  to also have  a geographic
dimension.  It is that dimension  that  is explored  heuristically  in what  follows.
24.  The  trade  strategy  for  the  United  States hypothesized  in the hi-open  scenario  is one  in
which  the  U.S. is trying  to rectify  its trade  balance  globally through  export  expansion  rather
than  import  contraction  and at  the same time  trying  to reduce  its import  dependence  on  Japan,
the  East  Asian NICs,  and  the  EC7 (50 percent  of U.S. imports  in  1985).  To do  this
12 percentage  points  of total  U.S. imports  are exogenously  allocated  away from Japan
(-6  percent  Pt), the  EC7 (-4  percent  pt) and  the EANICs  (-2  percent  pt) and  redirected  toward
the large closed economies  (the Soviet Union  (+2 percent  pt),  China (+I  percent  pt) and  India
(+0.5 percent  pt) toward  other  NIC blocs (Latin  America  (+2 percent  pt),  Next Tier  Asia
(+2 percent  pt),  and  Eastern  Europe  (+1.5 percent  pt) and  toward  the  highly indebted  countries
(HICs) (+2 percent  pt).  This amounts  to trade  strategy  of opening  the  U.S. toward  the socialist
bloc on the  import  side,  an attempt  to alleviate the  trade-debt  conundrum  in Latin  America  and
the HICs,  and  to increase  trade  with  India  and  Next Tier  Asia.  In some measure,  these shifts
anticipate  the  likelihood  that  the  U.S. will loose some of its share of the EC7 and  ECMed
markets  as these economies  make  room for  more  trade  between  themselves  and  that  the U.S. will
need  to develop  stronger  trade  relations  elsewhere  to compensate  for  weaker  links with  Europe.
25.  The  trade  strategy  for  La=  is to increase  its import-GDP  share  to the level of its
export-GDP  share  by opening  its market  relatively  more to  imports  from  the U.S., Latin
America,  the  HICs and  China.  The strategy  is meant  to ease the  U.S. trade  imbalance  with
Japan,  alleviate  the world  debt  problem,  and spur  export growth  in  important  Japanese  markets
so that  trade  balance adjustn.ent  in Japan  can occur  with  continued  high export-GDP  shares  for
Japan  rather  than  through  the contraction  of exports.  This trade  strategy  is also an attempt  to- 14  -
anticipate a loss of Japanese market share in the enlarged European market and to globalize
Japanese trade links beyond the Pacific Basin.  To do this, import coefficients for Japan are
reconfigured to increase the proportion of Japanese imports from the U.S. (+4 percent pt), Latin
America (+1 percent pt), the HICs (+2 percent pt) and China (+2pt) and to decrease the
proportion from the EC7 (-2 percent pt), the EANICs (-3.4 percent pt) and Next Tier Asia
(-3 percent pt) in the hi-open scenar,o.
26.  The trade strategy for the Euronean Community entails an increase in intra-EC7 trade
from 51 to 53 percent, an increase in EC7 imports from ECMed from 3 to 5 percent, in EC7
imports from NonECMed from 2 to 3 percent, and an increase in EC7 imports from EE6 from 2
to 3 percent.  This combined shift in import coefficients of 6 percentage points of total EC7
imports is offset by a reduction in the percentage of imports from the U.S. (-3 percent pt),
Japan (-I  percent pt), Latin America (-I  percent pt), the EANICs (-I  percent pt) and the HICs
(-I  percent pt).  The further integration of the European Community in the early 1990s  is
hypothesized to have a major effect on the share of total imports by Spain, Portugal and Greece
from the EC7 economies. The ECMed import coefficient with the EC7 increases from 43 to
50 percent to reach to the level of intra-EC7 trade in 1985. This leads to a reduction in the
ECMed import coefficients with the U.S. (-2 percent pt), Japan (-I  percent pt), Latin America
(-3 percent pt) and the HICs (-I  percent pt).  The import sourcing structure of the NonECMed
economies is projected to shift toward the EC7, increasing from 37.4 percent to 40 percent, and
toward the ECMed, increasing from 3 to 4 percent.  These increases would be offset by declines
in NonECMed import coefficients with the U.S. (-2 percent pt), Japan (-1.4 percent pt) and
Latin America (-0.5 percent pt).
27.  The combined effect of these shifts by the three European blocs is to weaken the
traditional trilateral iinkages between the U.S., the EC and Japan and to reduce imports from
Latin America as trade ties within the broad European region are strengthened through further
integration.  This includes some opening by the EC7 to imports from the Eastern European NICs
at the cost of imports from the East Asian NICs which themselves  are developing trade ties with
the EE6.  (New York Times September 29, 1988)
28.  The trade strategy for Latin America is to export sufficiently not only to service
external debt but to maintain imports at a high enough level to sustain investment and internal
stability.  The hi-open scenario envisages  the import-GDP share of LAT rising from 7 percent- 15 -
in  1985 to 10 percent in 1995 with the expectation that the scenario will induce an LAT export-
GDP share of  14 percent or so in 1995. The three large Latin American economies will
continue to be major forces in world trade.  The hi-open scenario hypothesizes Latin America
looking for trade relations in the Pacific Basin and in Europe as a way of deregionalizing  its
dominant trade patterns with the U.S.  A draconian shift away from the U.S. is projected with
the LAT import coefficient with the U.S. dropping from 42 percent to 30 percent.  This shift is
offset by increases in imports from Japan (+3 percent pt), from EC7 (+3 percent pt), in intra-
LAT trade (+3 percent pt), from NICs and NTA (+2 percint pt) and OPEC (+I percent pt).
29.  Tbh trade strategy of the East Asian NICs is to open more to imports (the import-
GDP share is projected to rise from 49 percent in 1985 to 54 percent in  1995 which is equal to
the export-GDP share in the base year) to achieve less of a trade surplus in the 1990s  as a
means of easing the general trade imbalances  of East Asia with the United States. The EANICs
are projected to increase trade relations in the Western hemisphere and to open to greater trade
with the socialist bloc while importing relatively less from the Asia Pacific region itself.  The
import coefficients are increased with the U.S. (+3 percent pt), LAT (+1.4 percent pt), SU
(+1 percent Pt), EE6 (+1 percent Pt) and China (+2 percent pt) while import coefficients are
decreased with Japan (-4 percent pt), NTA (-2 percent pt), intra-NIC trade (-I  percent pt) and
the EC7 (-2 percent pt).
30.  The trade strategy of Next Tier Asia is very similar to the EANICs.  Imports as a
share of GDP are projected to increase by 1995 to 30 percent from 26 percent in 1985 to ease
the East Asian trade surplus with the rest of the world.  Import coefficients are increased with
the U.S. (+2.6 percent pt), LAT (+1 percent pt), EE6 (+1.4 percent pt), SU (+1.7 percent pt), and
the HICs (+1.7 percent pt) while import coefficients are reduced with Japan (-3.4 percent pt),
EC7 (-2 percent Pt), NICs (-2 percent pt), and NTA (-1.4 percent pt).  Under this scenario,
Next Tier Asia is deregionalizing,  opening to the socialist bloc (except China), and shifting
import demand toward the U.S. and Latin America while importing relatively less from Europe.
These geographic shifts complement its macropolicy  effort to contribute to greater global
balance.
31.  The trade strategy imagined (perhaps an appropriate word) for Eastern Europe
contemplates a major shift in intra-CMEA (Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, i.e. the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe) from 70 percent of total EE6 imports to 50 percent.  The- 16 -
import coefficient of intra-EE6 trade is reduced from 21 to 15 percent and the EE6 import
coefficient with the Soviet Union is reduced from 49 to 35 percent.  East Europe increases its
trade with the rest of the world by increasing its import coefficients with the U.S. (+4 percent
Pt), Japan (+4 percent pt), EC7 (+3 percent pt), LAT (+2 percent pt), NICs (+I percent pt),
China (+1 percent pt), India (+1 percent pt), and the HICs (+2 percent pt).  The trade pattern
envisaged for Eastern Europe in this scenario is a shift from inward-looking trade relations
within the region and dependence on the Soviet Urnion  to a major opening of trade relations
with the rest of the world.  The orders of magnitude in this rendering probably considerably
overstate the extent of this shift that would be likely to occur over a ten year period.  In this
sense, it is a maximalist dimensioning of a global strategy by the EE6.
32.  The trade strategy for the Soviet Union is quite similar to that of Eastern Europe and
complements  it.  The Soviet Union reduces its import coefficients with the EE6 from 48 percent
of Soviet imports to 35 percent in 1995 with a small reduction of two percentage,  points in the
coefficient with NonECMed, especially Yugoslavia  and Turkey).  The Soviet Union embarks on
a global export strategy hoping to raise both its export-GDP and its import-GDP shares by 1995
to around 10 percent from about 7 percent in  1985  (CEPII data), to achieve bilateral balance
through shifts in its import sourcing strategy toward the rest of the world, trying to improve its
access to technology in the process. As a result, Soviet import coefficients in this scenario are
increased with the United States by 4 percentage points, and with Japan and Europe by
2 percentage points each.  Other increases are with the NICs (+1.6 percent pt), NTA
(+1.4 percent pt), China (+2 percent pt), India (+1.5 percent pt) and the HICs (+0.7 percent pt).
These shifts are reciprocated by the opening of the U.S., the NICs, NTA, and OPEC to imports
from the Soviet Union.  In this scenario, however, there is no increase in the opening of
Europe, Japan, China, or India to the Soviet economy.  Alternatives can be explored
subsequently.
33.  The trade strategy for China attempts to enable the PRC to return to an import-GDP
share that peaked in  1985  at 12 percent without incurring such a massive trade deficit as to
trigger an immediate closing of the economy in subsequent years, as occurred in 1986 when
imports as a share of GDP declined to 8 percent.  China's strategy in this scenario is to obtain
its manufactured goods imports from the U.S. and Eastern Europe (rather than the EANICs and
Japan) and to obtain its raw material imports from Latin America and Next Tier Asia.  Other
alternatives could be imagined.  This scenario follows the pattern of other blocs in reaching- 17 -
outside  the  region to less traditional  sources of imports.  As a result,  the import  coefficient  with
the U.S. increases  by  5 percentage  points  while that  with  Japan  declines  by  8 percentage  points
(this is clearly  extremely  large) and  that  with the  EC7 decreases by  3 percentage  points  of
China's  total  imports.  The import  coefficient  with  LAT,  NTA, and  EE6  increase  by
2 percentage  points  each.
34.  The trade  strategies  for  Iia&,  the HICs and  the LICs remains  unchanged  in its import
sourcing  dimension.  Import  coefficients  for  these three  blocs remain  constant  for  all three
scenarios.  India  opens its economy  in the hi-open  scenario  pushing  its import-GDP  share to
12 percent.  Except  for  the  EC7, China,  and the  HICs,  the import  coefficients  for  all the  other
blocs with  the  LICs double  between  1985 and  1995, though  these are all  I percent  or below  in
1985.  This  low percentage  is itself  a  measure of the  weak pull the world  economy exerts  on the
poorest  countries.  The trade  strategy  of OPEC is to derive  more of  its imports  from  the  Latin
American,  East  Asian and  East  European  NICs as well as the large  socialist economies  while
reducing  its import  shares with  the  OECD economies.  As a result,  the  import coefficients  with
the  U.S., Japan  and  the EC decline  by  2 pefrcentage points  each.  The  OPEC import  coefficients
with  LAT,  NICs,  EE6,  the Soviet Union,  China and  the  LICs. increase  by  1 percentage  point  of
OPEC imports  each.
III.  THE INDUCED  PATITERNS OF TRADE  AND  EXPORT  GROWTH
A.  Lo-Closed  Versus Hi-Oven  Scenarios
35.  The principal  results  for  each scenario  are the level of GDP,  the  magnitude  of  total
exports,  the rate  of growth  of exports  between  1985 and  1995, and the  export-GDP  share  in
1995.  The export-GDP  share  in  1995 induced  by each scenario  can be juxtaposed  to the
import-GDP  share  target  in  1995 to derive  the balance of  trade  (BOT) as a percentage  of GDP
for  each bloc in  1995.  These trade  balance  results can tell us which  countries  or blocs are
correcting  their  imbalances  and  which  countries  are  bearing  the  burden  of  trade  deficits  to spur
world  trade  and  economic  growth.
36.  Table  IV shows the  exogenously determined  GDP  growth rates  and  the endogenously
determined  export  growth  rates  for  the three  scenarios.- 18 -
The  basic gattefn  in  the relations  of  these two sets of  girowth rates  is that  the export  growth  rate
lags behind  the  GDP  arowth  rate in  the lo-closed  scenario,  is roughlv eauivalent  to it in the
base case. and  exce_ds the GDP  growth  rates  in the hi-open  scenario.  This makes intuitive
sense, given  the assumptions.  These relations  hold for  11 of the  15 blocs; the exceptions  are  the
U.S., Japan,  the  East  Asian NICs, and  Next Tier  Asia.  Export  growth  rates in  Pacific  Asia are
lower  in the  hi-open  scenario  because the  deregionalization  of trade  patterns  embodied  in this
scenario  drain  the  region of some of its growth  stimulus.  With this  exception,  however,  export
growth  rates are  quite  robust  in this  scenario.
37.  In the  lo-closed  scenario,  however,  world  export growth  rates  are dismal.  Given  the
fact  that  modest  GDP  growth  rate and  import-GDP  share assumptions  generate  export  growth
rates  that  are roughly  equal  to GDP growth  rates  in the  base case,  it is clear from  the  results  in
the  lo-closed  case that  world  trade  will suffer  severe setbacks if  import-GDP  shares fall as
projected  in  that scenario.  In fact,  the GDP  growth assumptions  in the  lo-closed  case are  not
dramatically  less than  the  base case, while  the trade  growth  results  are decidedly  worse.  The
only other  causal  variable  to change is the set of import-GDP  shares.  These decrease  in general
by only 2 percentage  points  of GDP  except  for  the U.S., the NICs,  and  China.  (See Table  III).
The volicy conclusion  suRRested by  this scenario  is that  sustaining  imDort caoacity  in the  thirty
six countries  in  the  maior  trading  blocs is crucial  to sustaining  world  trade  growth.
38  The  1995 export-GDP  shares  induced  by each of the lo-closed  and  hi-open  scenarios
are  shown  in Tables V and  VI.  In the  lo-closed  scenario,  the  1995 export-GDP  share  drops  in
all  blocs  compared  to the  1985 levels, except  for  the United  States which  maintains  its  1985
level of only  8 percent.  The large declines  are  in the  NICs and  Next Tier  Asia,  with  a
4 percentage  point  decrease  in Japan  and  the EC and  3 percentage  point  declines  in Latin
America  and  the  HICs.
39.  Under  this  scenario,  the  United  States does indeed achieve  trade  balance  with  the
export-GDP  share falling  precisely  to the import-GDP  share  level.  Japan  continues  to run  a
trade  surplus,  but down  to 2 percentage  points of GDP  from  4 in  1985. Exports as a  share of
GDP  in  Japan  drop  4 percentage  points,  from  17 to  13 percent.  This  is clearly  not the Dreferred
oath  for  economic  adjustment  for  either  Jaoan  or the  U.S., quite  apart  from  the  negative
spillover  effects  this pattern  for  the  economic  superpowers  would have on  the  world economy  as
a  whole.- 19 -
40.  Given balance in the U.S.and the EC and a surplus in Japan, the blocs running trade
deficits in this scenario are the East Asian NICs and Next Tier Asia as well as the world's
poorest countries, the LICs and india. All three socialist bloc entities, the Soviet Union, Eastern
Europe, and China, achieve trade balance but with very low trade-GDP shares and quite low
GDP growth rates.  Latin America and the HICs run trade surpluses but with very low import-
GDP shares in LAT and very low GDP growth rates (3.2 percent) in the HICs.
41.  The induced export-GDP shares and resulting trade balances for the hi-oDen scenario
are shown in Table VI. The export-GDP shares improve over the base case in all blocs  except
for Japan and the EANICs. The blocs that reap the largest export-GDP share increases over the
1985 base case are ECMed, China, and the LICs with lesser but still substantial gains by Eastern
Europe, NonECMed, India, NTA and to a lesser extent LAT.  Compared to the lo-closed
scenario, these results constitute major gains for all blocs on both the import and the export
side.
42.  The U.S. continues to run a trade deficit of 2 percentage points of GDP while Japan
achieves balance with the import share rising to the export share of 1985, a share which is
actually achieved in  1995. This scenario generates a strong demand for Eastern European and
Chinese exports resulting in trade surpluses in  1995. The further integration of the European
Community and its enlargement yields significant trade gains for the EC7 but especially for
Spain, Portugal and Greece and to a lesser extent for the NonECMed bloc.  Latin America, the
HICs and OPEC also run trade surpluses with strong export performance in both growth and
share terms.  The main trade deficit blocs in this scenario are the NICs, NTA and India.
43.  Further dimensions of the differences between these three scenarios are seen in Table
VII which shows the world totals for exports and GDP in 1995 under each scenario and the
structure of world exports and world GDP by bloc in  1995. The hi-open scenario achieves $2.4
trillion more world GDP in 1995 than the lo-closed scenario and generates $1.4 trillion more
exports.  Compared to the base case, the hi-open scenario reaches $1.6 trillion more GDP and
induces $870 billion more exports.
44.  The structure of world GDP by blocs does not change very much perhaps because the
GDP growth rates by bloc are within a reasonably close range.  But the structure of worid
exports by blocs does show some significant change with the OECD losing 3.3 percentage points- 20 -
Table  IV:  Exvort  and GDP  Growth  Rates
1985-1995
(Average  Annual  Real Rates of Growth)
Lo-Closed  Base Case  Hi-Open
USA  Export  2.1  3.6  5.8
GDP  2.0  2.3  3.0
Japan  Export  .5  3.5  3.5
GDP  3.0  3.4  3.8
EC  Export  1.9  3.3  5.8
GDP  3.0  3.4  4.4
ECMED  Export  1.8  3.3  9.1
GDP  3.0  3.4  4.4
NECMED  Export  1.3  3.1  7.0
GDP  3.0  3.4  4.4
LAT3  Export  .3  3.0  5.6
GDP  3.0  4.0  4.5
NICs  Export  .9  3.5  4.0
GDP  5.0  6.0  7.0
N.T.Asia  Export  1.4  3.8  6.4
GDP  5.0  6.0  7.0
E.Europe  Export  ..1  2.9  5.6
GDP  1.4  2.0  3.0
USSR  Export  1.0  2.8  5.0
GDP  2.3  2.8  3.3
China  Export  1.7  4.0  10.2
GDP  3.0  4.0  5.0
India  Export  .9  3.2  9.2
GDP  4.0  5.0  6.0
HICs  Export  .9  3.2  6.0
GDP  3.0  3.2  5.0
OPEC  Export  1.9  3.7  6.6
GDP  2.7  2.7  3.7
LICs  Export  1.9  3.6  9.8
GDP  3.0  5.4  6.0- 21 -
Table  V:  Lo-Closed  Scenario  1995
Percent  of GDP
M/Y  X/Y  X/Y  BOT
Lo-Closed  1985  Lo-Closed  Lo-Closed
Actual  percent  pt  GDP
Surp!ius  Deficit
USA  8  8  8  0
Jaean  11  17  13  +2
EC  28  32  28  0
ECMED  20  23  21  +1
NECMED  23  23  20  -3
LAT3  5  14  11  +6
NICs  45  54  39  -6
N.T.Asia  24  29  20  -4
E.Europe  15  17  15  0
USSR  5  7  6  +1
China  7  8  7  0
India  7  6  4  -3
HICs  16  20  17  +1
OPEC  18  n.a.  17  -1
LICs  22  15  13  -8
Table  VI:  Hi-Ot,en  Scenario  1995
Percent  of GDP
M/Y  X/Y  X/Y  BOT
Hi-Open  Base Case  Hi-Open  Hi-Open
percent  pt GDP
Surplus  Deficit
USA  13  10  11  -2
Janan  17  17  17  0
EC  35  32  36  +1
ECMED  26  23  36  +10
NECMED  27  22  30  +3
LAT3  10  13  15  +5
NICs  54  42  41  -13
N.T.Asia  30  24  27  -3
E.Europe  20  19  22  +2
USSR  10  7  8  -2
China  12  8  14  +2
India  12  5  8  -4
HICs  16  20  22  +6
OPEC  20  20  24  +4
LICs  22  13  21  -1Table  Vil:  Simulation:  Global  Results  (Fle  :2RESULT  Range  A22..Q49s
23-NOY-8e  Fl  2EUT  ag  2.q9
1  9  9 6  W o  R L  D  T R A D E  S C E H A R I  0 S
(Millians  of  constant  3  of  1980)
1985  1996  LOW-CLOSED  CASE  1996  UDR  BASE CASE  1996  HIGH-OPEN  CASE
REGIOS  CDP  N  X  x  CDP  X  X  X  COP  X  X  X  CDP  X  X  X
USA  3111930  22.0  281172  9.a  3793425  20.6  322279  10.2  3908486  20.a  871444  9.8  4182174  19.9  4e3228  9.6
JAPAN  1280840  9.0  219683  8.2  1721073  9.3  233013  7.4  1789091  9.3  308318  8.1  3988795  9.5  310116  8.4
EC  2938468  20.8  932940  34.3 3949042  21.4  1221497  36.4  4106111  21.3  1294913  34.2  4619866  21.6  1P47376  34.1 ,
ECMED  295991  2.1  68338  2.6  397787  2.2  82062  2.6  413608  2.1  94626  2.5  465286  2.2  163411  3.4  "J
NECUED  204486  1.4  47286  1.7  274811  1.5  63900  1.7  285871  1.6  64174  1.7  314633  1.5  93310  1.9
LA73  6266e3  3.7  72746  2.7  708313  3.8  76008  2.4  777962  4.0  97606  2.6  818183  3.9  128412  2.6
HICS  198800  1.4  105842  - 3.9  320668  1.7  116338  3.6  362439  1.8  149323  8.9  387136  1.8  168180  3.3
N.T.ASIA  201878  ;.4  58764  2.2  328838  1.8  68478  2.2  361533  1.9  86394  2.3  397126  1.9  111070  2.3
E.EUR  646362  4.8  110628  4.1  742772  4.0  113761  3.0  787912  4.1  146971  3.9  8so86e  4.1  191232  4.0
USSR  1700000  12.0  113900  4.2  2123648  11.5  126173  4.0  2240881  11.6  160629  4.0  2352080  11.2  186326  3.9
CHINA  466393  3.3  39403  1.4  626449  3.4  47986  1.6  889805  3.0  t8429  1.6  768076  3.6  106796  2.2
INDIA  226124  1.6  12860  0.6  333239  1.8  14122  0.4  368703  1.9  17589  0.5  4031e3  1.9  31214  0.6
HICS  384214  2.7  7s687  2.9  616361  2.8  e8844  2.7  526486  2.7  107609  2A  6  26844  3.0  138826  2.9
OPEC  822877  6.8  148179  5.4  1074087  6.8  179739  6.7  1074087  5.6  213493  6.6  1183376  5.r  284692  6.9
LICS  133176  0.9  19863  0.7  178978  1.0  23999  0.8  226336  1.2  28189  0.7  238496  1.1  61020  1.1
Rest.  1018109  7.2.  430884  16.8  1326867  7.2  501109  16.8  1388939  7.2  699985  16.8  1512216  7.2  764349  15.8
V.707AL  14160999  100.0  2721822  100.0  18412042  100.0  3166662  100.0  19290817  100.0  3790060  100.0  21002991  100.0  4828487  100.0
SUBTOTAL  13132890  92.8  2289869  84.1  17086375  92.8  2883188  84.1  17901878  92.8  3188689  84.1  19490776  92.8  4082200  84.1- 23 -
of world exports in the hi-open scenario compared to the lo-closed scenario.  ECMed and C! ina
make the biggest gains while the LICs, EE6, LAT, and India also make incremental gains in the
share of world exports in the hi versus the lo scenario.  The NICs and the Soviet Union loose
world export market share while NonECMed, LAT, India, the HICs and OPEC make small
gains.
B.  Variants of the Hi-Onen Scenario
Pacific Basin Growth
45.  As a result of the attempt to decentralize the patterns of world trade, in the hi-open
scenario, perhans an excessive proportion of import demand has been shifted away from Japan
and the East-Asian NICs.  This scenario, in fact, deflects nearly 18 percentage points of total
import demand of other blocs away from Japan.  The NICs experience an adverse shift of
6 percentage points of OECD import demand.  As a result of these assumptions (and the fact
that the trade-GDP shares of the NICs are extremely high, [M/Y equals 49 percent and X/Y
equals 54 pecent on 19851,  export growth rates and export - GDP shares in  1995  are not what
one would expect from these dynamic economies. By changing the import coefficient of the
trading partners of Japan and the NICs to restore 14 percentage points of import demand to
Japan and 6 percentage points to the NICs, the model generates more favorable results for both
blocs.  Japan's export growth rate for the decade improves by a full percentage point, from 3.5
to 4.5 percent, and its export-GDP share rises to 17 percent.  In the NICs, export growth moves
up from 4.1 to 4.9 percent while its export - GDP share jumps from 41 to 44 percent.  The cost
of the improvement in the Pacific Basin outlook is a drop of 2 percentage points in the export-
GDP share for both the HICs and the LICs.  The export growth rate for the decade for the
HICs drops from 5.9 percent to 5.0 and for the LICs from 9.9 to 8.8 percent.
46.  If the growth rates and import-GDP shares from the hi-open scenario for all blocs are
used with no changes in the trade matrix, the export-GDP shares for Japan and the NICs
improve still more, by 3 and 6 percentage points, respectively, over the hi-open scenario with
import coefficient changes. This shows the degree to which the current structure of world trade
favors Japan and the East Asian NICs.  But five other blocs experience major declines in
export-GDP shares:  ECM from 36 percent to 26 percent; NECM from 30 to 26 percent; China
from 14 to 10 percent; India from 8 to 6 percent;  and the LICs from 21 to 15 percent.- 24  -
European  Inteeration
47.  The absence  of EC integration  and  of the increases  in import-GDP  shares  that
accompany  it have a negative  effect  on export  growth rates  in 7 of the  12 blocs outside  of
Europe,  no effect  on  US and  Japan  export  growth rates  compared  to the  hi-open  case and
positive  effects  on export  growth  rates  in LAT,  HICs, and  the  EANICs.
48.  If somehow Europe  were able to maintain  the higher  import-GDP  shares of the hi-
open  case without  the geographic  reallocation  of import  coefficients  (Mij)  within  the three
European  blocs and  between  them and  the rest of  the world,  then  US and  Japanese  export
growth  would  be enhanced  considerably  over  the hi-open  case as would  LAT,  HIC,  and  NIC
export  growth.  Export-GDP  shares behave  in commensurate  fashion.  (See Table  VIII.)
The  e  vineitBl
49.  There  is a question  of what difference  the opening  of SU and  EE to the  market
economies  makes to the other  blocs.  If we lower  the GDP  growth rates  to levels in the  base case
for  the Soviet Union  (3.3 to 2.8) and  for  EE (3.0 to 2.0), reduce the  import-GDP  shares  to the
base case for  the SU (10 to 7 percent)  and  EE (20 to  18 percent),  and  change their  import  co-
efficients  back to the  base case (i.e. highly,  regionalized  trade)  but  leave the  assumptions  of the
hi-open  case for  all other  blocs in  place,  the model will generate results  which allow a rough
understanding  of the  impact  of the opening  of the SU and  EE on  the world  economy.  Given
their  small  trade  with  the rest  of the  world,  we would expect  these export  growth  losses in other
blocs to be relatively  small.  This simulation  also measures  the impact  of a  unilateral  opening  of
other  blocs to the Soviet Union  and  the EE6  on these  two socialist blocs.
50.  The  results show that  the  US, Japan,  NECM,  LA,  NICs,  NTA, and  the HICs loose
between  0.4 and  0.6 percentage  points  on their  average annual  real growth  of exports  for  the
1985 to  1995 period.  China  looses I percentage  point  and  India  looses 2.7 percentage  points  of
export  growth.  The only  blocs not to experience  an export  growth-rate  loss are:  The
EC7,ECM,  OPEC and  the  LICs.  The export-GDP  share drops slightly  in seven  of the  thirteen
blocs (Table  IX.)- 25 -
51.  Another  interesting  result  is that  the unilateral  opening of  the other  blocs toward the
SU and  the  EE6 as hypothesized  in hi-open  scenario  actually  increases  the export  growth  of the
SU over  the  result  in the hi-open  reciprocal  opening  case from  5.0 to  5.5 percent.  This  is due
to  the fact  that  the SU is getting  the  benefit  of the openness of EE to SU in  current  patterns
along  with  the new opening  of the other  blocs to it embodied  in the hi-open  scenario.  The
EE6, on  the other  hand,  experience  a slight loss in export growth  because  of the  large increase
over  the  hi-open  scenario  in  the SU import  coefficient  with EF  (from  35 to 48 percent),  and  the
slow growth  of the Soviet economy.
52.  The results  provide  evidence  that  the  rest of  the world has a significant  stake in  the
opening  of the SU and  EE to the  world  economy in terms of expanded  export  demand,  and  that
the SU and  the  EE6 stand  to make significant  gains by  an opening of other  major  trading  states
to  them.
The Fate of  the  LICs
53.  The hi-open  scenario  is quite  optimistic  for  the  lower income countries  LICs.  The
5.4 percent  GDP  growth  in the  WDR base case projections  for  the  LICs includes  of Chind and
India.  More reasonable  assumptions  would be 3.0 percent  GDP  growth in  the lo-closed  scenario,
3.5 in the  base case and  4.0 in the  hi-open  scenario.  Isolating  the lowering of  the hi-open  GDP
growth  rate for  the LICs by  one  third,  from  6 to 4 percent,  has only a slight  impact  on export
growth  rates in other  blocs.  Only  the EC7, India,  OPEC and the  LICs themselves  experience  a
0.1 percent  decline  in their export  growth prospects  for  the  decade.  This shows the  negligible
effect  of the  LICs on the  world  economy.
54.  The hi-open  scenario  also assumes a doubling  of the import  coefficient  of most other
blocs in  the model with  the  LICs.  To test  the sensitivities  of the outlook  for  the  LICs to the
other  changes embodied  in hi-open  scenario,  the doubling  of import  coefficients  is removed.
This  along with  the  lower GDP  growth  rate  for  the LICs,  yields an export-GDP  share of
18 percent  for  the LICs instead  of 21 percent,  implying  a trade  deficit  of 4 percent  of GDP  in
this  version  of the  hi-open  scenario.  Their  export  growth rate  falls from  9.8 percent  in the
original  hi-open  scenario  to 5.8 percent  in this  version.  This is an  improvement  over  the base
case (15 percent  import-GDP  share and  3.6 percent  export  growth)  but is still far  short  of needs
of  these countries.  A  real improvement  in the economic  prospects  of the LICs  require  the  major- 26  -
changes  in world  economic  conditions  and the  massive increase  in demand  for  their  exports  over
the next  decade  embodied  in the hi-open  scenario.
Table  VIII:  Hi-Onen  Scenario  With and  Without EC Integration
Extort  Growth  Rates  Export  - GDP  Shares
W/O EC Mij  W/O EC Mij  W/O EC Mij  W/O EC M-j
With EC  M/Y-Base  Case M/Y=Hi-Open  With EC  M/Y=Base Case M/YmHi-Open
USA  5.9  5.9  6.8  11  1!  12
J  3.5  3.5  4.1  16  16  16
EC  5.9  4.3  5.6  36  32  35
ECM  9.1  4.6  5.8  36  24  26
NECM  7.0  4.1  5.0  30  22  24
LA  5.7  6.5  7.0  15  17  18
NIC  4.1  4.4  4.9  41  42  44
NTA  6.6  6.3  6.6  28  27  28
EE  5.6  4.4  4.9  22  20  21
SU  5.0  4.0  4.7  8  7  8
China  10.4  10.1  10.4  14  14  14
India  9.3  8.9  9.3  8  7  8
HICS  5.9  6.7  7.5  22  24  26
OPEC  6.8  5.8  6.5  24  22  23
LICS  9.9  9.3  9.9  21  20  21-27  -
Table  IX:  Hi-Oven  Scenario With and Without SU & EE Ooening
Exnort-GDP  Shares  Exoort  Growth  Rates
Hi-Open  Without SU/EE  Hi-Open  Without SU/EE
US  I1  1  1  5.9  5.5
J  16  15  3.5  3.0
EC  36  36  5.9  5.7
ECM  36  36  5.9  5.7
NECUM  30  29  9.0  6.6
LA  15  15  5.7  5.3
NIC  41  39  4.1  3.7
NTA  28  27  6.6  6.1
EE  22  24  5.6  5.5
SU  8  9  5.0  5.5
CH  14  13  10.4  9.4
IND  8  6  9.3  6.6
HIC  22  21  5.9  5.3
OPEC  24  24  6.8  6.7
LIC  21  21  9.9  9.7
Note  Scenario without  SU & EE  is the hi-open  scenario  for  all other
blocs,  with  base case assumptions  in the SU and  EE6  blocs for  GDP
growth,  import  GDP shares and  import  coefficients.
IV.  ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR THE WORLD  ECONOMY: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
55.  A number  of scenarios  are possible for  the  world economy in  the future.  How the
world  economy actually  evolves will depend  on a variety  of forces  many of which  are beyond
the  direct  control  of economic  policy.  As a result,  the  degree to which  the world  economy
realistically can  be guided  by strategy  towards a  prescribed  set of outcomes  is an open question.
Nonetheless,  it is worth  exploring  various options  lest the  path  of least resistance  be accepted
without  knowledge  of the  "road not take", to pirate  an American  poet's  turn  of  phrase.
56.  The  most likely path  for  the world economy  is one which  results  from  the
continuation  of current  policies in the  major  economies and  the steady evolution  of the  global
economic  structure.  In this paper,  status quo economic  policies are expected  to lead to modest
GDP  growth  rates  in this  scenario,  continuing  imbalances and  constant  openness  to trade
(import-GDP  shares).  A second scenario  (lo-closed)  envisions  contractionary  policies leading to- 28 -
slower economic  growth  which  force  gradual  reductions  of trade  as a share of GDP  in the  major
blocs due  to poo- export  prospects.  A  third  scenario  (hi-open)  assumes expansionary  policies in
the major  economic  blocs leading  to an improved  export outlook,  higher  imports  and  stronger
economic  growth.  This  more dynamic  scenario  could  either  occur  within  the current  patterns  of
regionalized  trade  or be accompanied  by a significant  reallignment  towards  increased  cross-
regional  globalized  trade.
57.  The higher  growth,  more open  economy scenario  generates  $1.6 trillion  more  world
GDP  and  roughly  $875 billion  (in  1980 dollars) more  in world  exports  in  1995 than  the current
policy  scenario.  This  gives some idea of  the stake the  world  has in attempting  to move towards
a  more dynamic  and  trade-oriented  set of economic  policies.  By contrast,  if  more  cautious
policies prevail  resulting  in slight'y  lower  GDP growth  rates  and  somewhat  lower  import-GDP
shares  (2 to 3 percentage  points  of GDP  less than  in the current  policy base case), world  GDP
drops  by  $800 billion  and  world  exports  by $500 billion  in  1980 dollars  than  the  base case.
58.  GDP  growth  rates  are exogenous  variables  in generating  these scenarios  of trade
growth.  Export  growth  is more sensitive  to changes  in the degree  of openness  measured by
import-GDP  shares  than  to changes in  GDP growth.  Average annual  world  GDP  growth  rates
for  the  period  1985 (base year)  to  1995 for  the three  scenarios  are  2.7, 3.2, and  4.0 percent
respectively  while the  average annual  rates of world  export  growth  for  the decade  for  these
scenarios  are  1.5, 3.4, and  5.6 percent  respectively.  These results show that  shifts  in trade
growth  rates are  more  than  proportionate  to changes  in GDP  growth due  to accompanying
changes in  the degree  of openness.
59.  The  importance  of  the nine  NIC  blocs in generating  these outcomes  is directly
proportionate  to their  weight  in world GDP.  Roughly  30 percent  of the increment  in  world
GDP  and  world exports  is due  to the nine  NIC  blocs.  Surprisingly,  there  is virtually  no
difference  in  the  world total  exports  in the high  growth,  open economy scenario  as between
regionalized  versus globalized  world  trade  patterns.  There  is, of course,  a  difference  in the
outcomes  by  bloc,  depending  on  how the globalized  trends  are configured.  Comparing  the  two
versions of  the more  dynamic  scenario,  the United  States,  Japan,  the East  Asian  NICs and
Eastern  Europe  have higher  export  growth rates  under  the current  structure  of regionalized
trade  whereas  the  two Southern  European  blocs,  Latin  America,  China,  India,  the  HICs, and
OPEC have  higher  export  growth  rates  under  the  more globalized  pattern.- 29 -
60.  Not only  does the  high growth,  open economy scenario  yield  higher  aggregate
outcomes  but it also produces  better  global  balance relative  to the  base case.  Not surprisingly,
the current  policy  (base case) scenario  results  in continuing  trade  imbalances  especially  in the
OECD  blocs but in the  other  blocs as well.  The high,  open scenario  in the prevailing
regionalized  world  economy  restores balance  in the United  States, Japan,  and  the  EC and  yields
less imbalance  in all other  blocs relative  to the  base case.  Latin  America  and  the seventeen
HICs run  trade  surpluses  of  3 to 4 percent  of GDP  in both scenarios  (providing  the  HICs do  not
increase  their  import-GDP  share),  while Latin  America  is able to increase  its import-GDP  share
by  3 percentage  points  in  the high, open  scenario.
61.  As a  result,  the high-open  scenario  moves towards  better  balance among  industrial
countries,  adaptation  of the rest  of the OECD  to further  EC integration,  an  incorporation  of the
socialist economies  into  world trade  and an  amelioration  of  the world  debt  problem.  All these
improvements  occur  within  the G-36.
62.  There  is much that  is hopeful  in this  analysis.  The multigolar  world  economy
provides  a structure  within  which  more ovenness to trade  in auantitative  terms and  more
expansionary  volicies in an enlarged  troup of key  countries,  including  economies  of the
developing  countries  and  the socialist world, can make  significant  differences  in the  rates of
growth  and  the  magnitude  of world  economic  growth  and trade.  A global strategy  of
simultaneous  expansion  of the twelve major  blocs would assure export  growth  prospects  which
then  would permit  the  increased  import  growth  upon  which  the strategy  itself  depends.  Unlike
the  intra-OECD  strategv  which  achieves  correction  of imbalance  in one  economy throuah
increased  imbalance  in others.  the  broader  alobal  strateny  moves toward  improved  trade  balances
in all  blocs as exvorts  and  imnorts  increase  together.
63.  Perhaps  the  most trying  aspect of  the global structure  is as it is related  to the lower
income countries.  High  GDP  growth  rates (a doubling  in LIC GDP  growth,  for  example)  make
virtua,ly  no difference  in the GDP  and export  growth  outcomes for  the  twelve groups  of major
countries.  As a result,  there  is no self-interested  rationale  that  can be developed  on behalf  of
the  lower  income countries,  as can be developed  in  the case of the nine  NIC  and socialist blocs,
that  spurring  their growth  has positive  feedback  effects  on  the OECD  economies.- 30 -
64.  These quantitative  structural  parameters  defining  the  role of the  lower  income
countries  in  the world  economy seem to illuminate  a dual  track  character  of the  world economy.
They  suggest  that  special and  specific  policy measures  have  to be taken  by  the world  community
and  by the  lower  income countries  themselves  to address  the  problems  of stagnant  growth and
misery  in these countries.  Whereas the  new multipolar  character  of the  world economy  presents
a structure  that  can be capitalized  on  through  a global strategy  to spur  dynamic  growth  among
the 36 significant  trade-oriented  economies  now constituting  the centre  of the  world economy,
that  structure  does not itself  logicallv lead to a strategv  for  economic  develoDment of  the
marginalized  lower  income countries.- 31 -
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THE  TRADE  HODEL
A.  The  Blocs
1.  The  trade  model  used  here  consists  of twelve  blocs  comprising
together  thirty  six  economies  with trade  as  a  high share  of GDP.  These
twelve  blocs  are  composed  of countries  which  by and  large  are  sufficiently
dynamic  that  they  have some  autonomy  in  policy  making. They  are  the  core
economies  of the  new  global  economy  which  are  capable  of proactive  policy
or strategic  trade  policy  behavior  and  which  together  largely  determine  the
overall  trends  in  the  world  ecor.omy.l/
2.  These  twelve  blocs  consist  of the  industrial  economies  --  the
United  States,  Japan  and  the  European  Community  7  (namely,  the  United
Kingdom,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Belgium  and  Luxembourg)
--  and  the  nine  NIC  blocs  discussed  in  section  I above,  namely  ECMed
(Spain,  Portugal,  Greece),  NonECMed  (Yugoslavia,  Turkey,  Egypt,  and
Israel),  the  three  major  Latin  America  economies  (Brazil,  Mexico,  and
Argentina),  East  Asian  NIC4 (Korea,  Taiwan,  Singapore,  and  Hong  Kong),  Next
Tier  Asia4 (Malaysia,  Thailand,  Indonesia  and  the  Philippines),  and  the
Eastern  European  6 (East  Germany,  Czechcslovakia,  Poland,  Hungary,  Romania,
1/  The  theoretical  basis  for  this  way  of thinking  about  trade  policy  is
contained  in:  Bradford,  Colin  I.,  Jr., "A  Strategic  Perspective  on
Trade  Regimes  and  Trade  Theory"  Strategic  Planning  Paper,  Fall  1988,
published  as "Une  Approche  Strategique  des  Regimes  de  Commerce
Exterieur  --  une  Troisieme  Voie  Possible  entre  Libre-exchange  et le
Protectionnisme"  in  Economie  Prospective  Internationale,  3Q trimestre
1989,  No. 39,  Paris: CEPII,  pp.  7-25.APPENDIX
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GROUP OF 36 PROACTIVE COUNTRIES
Industrial  Country Blocs
1.  United States
2.  Japan
3.  EC7  Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom.
NIC Blocs
1.  EC Mediterranean  Greece, Portugal and Spain
2.  Non-EC Med.  Egypt, Israel,  Turkey and Yugoslavia
3.  Latin America  Argentina. Brazil, and Mexico
4.  East Asian NICs  Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan
5.  Next Tier Asia  Indonesia,  Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand
6.  Eastern Europe  Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,  German Democratic
Republic,  Hungary, Poland, Romania
7.  Soviet Union
8.  China
9.  India
IMPACTED DEVELOPING COUNTRY BLOCS
1.  HICs  Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Morocco,
Nigeria, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela
2.  OPEC  Algeria, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi
Arabia
3.  LICs  28 of the 39 low-income countries in World Bank WDR
category, excluding China and India
Notes:  HICs:  Highly Indebted Countries
OPEC:  Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
LICs:  Low Income  CountriesAPPENDIX
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and  Bulgaria),  and  three  large  closed  economies,  namely  the  Soviet  Union,
China  and  India.
3.  The  rest  of  the  developing  world  was  divided  into  three  blocs  to
represent  groups  of  countries  of  major  interest  to the  World  Bank.  The
first  of these  blocs  consists  of seventeen  highly  indebted  countries  now
known  as the  HICs.  These  countries  are: Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,
Chile,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Ecuador,  Jamaica,  Mexico,
Morocco,  Nigeria,  Peru,  the  Philippines,  Uruguay,  Venezuela,  and
Yugoslavia.  The  HIC  bloc in  this  trade  model  contains  the  twelve  countries
from  this  group  that  are  left  once  the  f've  countries  (underlined)  that
belong  to one  of the  core  blocs  have  been  eliminated.  The second  bloc
consists  of the  oil  exporting  countries  (OPEC)  once  overlapping  countries
have  been  dropped. This  strips  this  bloc  of some  major  oil  exporters  but
duplication  is  not logical  and  the  integrity  of the  other  blocs  was deemed
more important  for  the  purposes  of this  model  than  the  integrity  of the
OPEC  bloc. As a result,  we have  a  proxy  OPEC  group. The  third  bloc  is the
World  Bank  category  of low  income  countries  (LICs)  that  consists  of the
twenty  eight  countries  in this  category  after  China  and  India  have  been
removed.
4.  This  model  involves  making  policy  assumptions  or strategy
decisions  for  the  twelve  core  blocs  that  generate  results  within  the  twelve
blocs  themselves  as  well as in  the  three  developing  country  blocs. The
three  developing  country  blocs  are  treated  as passive  blocs  which  are
impacted  on  by the  strategies  and  resultant  patterns  of the  twelve  coreAPPENDIX
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blocs.  The sixteenth  bloc, called rest of the  world, contains the
remaining  developing countries and the following industrial countries:
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, the Scandinavian countries, Ireland,
Austria and Switzerland.  Of the World Bank's category of twenty three
upper middle income countries only Panama,  Uruguay and South Africa are in
this residual  bloc.  The most numerous group in the rest of the  world bloc
is seventeen  of the thirty lower  middle income  countries that are mostly in
Central  America, the Caribbean,  Africa and the Middle East.  (The list is:
Liberia, Yemen (PDR),  Yemen (Arab  Republic), Zimbabwe, the Dominican
Republic, Papua New Guinea, Honducas, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Botswana, Jamaica, Paraguay, Tunisia, Mauritius, Jordan and Lebanon.)
5.  The model is built around the trade  matrix composed of columns
containing the demand for imports by the fifteen  blocs and rows consisting
of the supply of exports by each bloc to every other bloc.  The diagonal
shows intra-bloc trade.  The model is intended to be and is in fact simple
and transparent.  The idea is that one should be able to trace outcomes
back to the inputs generating them.
B.  The Assumptions and Exogeneous Variables
6.  There are several restrictive features and assumptions in this
model.  First, it is a real side set of relations  with financial  variables,
for the moment at least, excluded.  There are rno  monetary variables
domestically and no capital account transactions internationally.  These
dimensions  may be incorporated in further  work.  The model generates tradeAPPENDIX
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balances  but  not  current  account  balances. The  trade  balance  results
obviously  imply  changes  in  domestic  macroeconomic  variables. If there  is
an increase  in  net exports  as a  percentage  of GDP,  clearly  investment,
consumption,  or government  spending  as a  percentage  of GDP  must  decline  to
make room  for  the  improvement  in  the  trade  balance. Conversely,  if  net
exports  decline,  domestic  absorption  can  increase. The  data sets  developed
along  with  the  trade  model  contain  the  domestic  macroeconomic  variables
consistent  with the  trade  matrix  but  at this  stage  there  has  not  been  time
to relate  them  analytically.  Given  some  of the  sizeable  changes  envisaged
in trade  patterns  in some  scenarios,  the  macroeconomic  counterparts  will
provide  a crucial  check  on the  consistency,  feasibility  and  desirability  of
trade  outcomes.
7.  The  important  point  here  is  that  the  modeling  effort  manipulates
trade  outcomes  first  and  then,  at a later  stage,  will derive  the
macroeconomic  adjustment  required  to  obtain  the  trade  results  rather  than
making  macro  assumptions  in  order  to generate  trade  outcomes. Obviously,
in  practice  the  macroeconomic  policy  inputs  would  constitute  the  instrument
variables  that  would  yield  the  trade  balance  results  but  for  the  moment  the
model  is intended  to treat  trade  as the  target  variable  and  then  develop
the  macroeconomic  implications  later.
8.  A second  characteristic  is that  this  model  is demand  driven. Each
bloc's  demand  for  imports  is the  key  driving  force  generating  the  outcomes.
These  import  demand  projections  induce  export  growth  in  the  rest  of the
world  in the  same  way that  final  demand  in  an input  output  matrix  generatesAPPENDI
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intermediate  production  and  hence  gross  output  results. The  endogenous
variable  in this  model  is  exports. As a result,  the  model  assumes  the
absence  of supply  bottlenecks  in  both  magnitude  and  composition  of
production  for  export. In  effect,  it  assumes,  for  example,  that  Eastern
Europe  would  in fact  be able  to  achieve  a specified  level  of exports  to  the
East  Asian  NICs  and  that  the  composition  of exports  would  be consistert
with  the  productive  structure  of Eastern  Europe  and  the  demand  pattern  of
East  Asia.
9.  There  are  three  exogenous  variables  in this  model. First,  the
rate  of GDP  growth  anticipated  for  each  of  the  fifteen  blocs  for  the  1985
to 1995  period  is assumed  rather  than  induced. The  growth  rates  for  this
period  contained  in the  World  Bank's  1988  World  Development  Report  base
case  were taken  as points  of departure  but  it  was  necessary  to alter  these
as  various  simulations  were  worked  through. This  projected  rate  of  GDP
growth  generates  a set  of  GDP  numbers  for  1995  for  each  bloc.
10.  The second  exogenous  variable  is the  target  import  share  of GDP  in
1995  for  each  of the  blocs. The  import-GDP  shares  can  be set  under  varying
assumptions  about  the  policy  environment  anticipated.  If sluggish  economic
growth  is anticipated  between  now  and  the  mid-1990s,  lower  import-GDP
shares  would  be expected  compared  to a  more  dynamic  global  economic  context
both  as cause  and  effect. Simultaneously  with specifying  the  import-GDP
shares,  estimations  are  made  about  the  export-GDP  share  that  should  be
consistent  with the  growth  and  import  share  assumptions.  The  export-GDP
share  is an  estimated  target  of  what the  results  would  be,  given  all  theAPPENDIX
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other  assumptions  being  made rather  than  a control  variable  as is the
import-GDP  share. Given  1995  GDP  numbers  and  1995  import-GDP  shares,  1995
import  numbers  (Mj)  are  derived  for  each  bloc.  These  are  the  demand
variables  for  the  trade  matrix.
11.  The  third  exogenous  variable  is the  import  strategy  of  each  bloc.
The  columns  in  the  trade  matrix  show  the  percentage  share  of total  imports
by each  bloc from  each  bloc.  This  model  supposes  that  countries  have  trade
strategies  that  are  on the  margin  directed  toward  certain  countries  or
regions  as sources  of imports  and  markets  for  exports. The  United  States,
for  example,  might  decide  that  increasing  imports  from  the  Soviet  Union
would  be in the  broader  security  interest  of the  United  States  as a  means
of integrating  the  Soviet  economy  into  the  world  economy. The  Koreans  are
reportedly  interested  in developing  export  markets  in  Eastern  Europe. The
Latin  Americans  are  interested  in  geographically  diversifying  their  export
markets,  especially  as the  U.S.  increasingly  needs  to adjust  its  trade
balance. Countries  send  trade  missions  abroad  with  the idea  of  promoting
exports  in  regions  where  larger  gains  are  anticipated  than  it is  expected
will  be achieved  by the  operation  of  market  forces  alone. And so  on.
Hence,  the  manipulation  of the  coefficients  in the  columns  of the  trade
matrix  represent  the  anticipated  results  of the  combination  of shifts  in
import  sourcing  strategies  on the  part  of each  bloc  and  the  shifts  in
export  marketing  strategies.  For  example,  if  we assume  that  the  share  of
total  U.S.  imports  from  the  Soviet  Union  in  1995  will  be double  that  in
1985,  we are  assuming  a degree  of complicity  between  the  superpowers  to
achieve  this  result  and  do  not  know  what  proportion  of this  result  is  dueAPPENDIX
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to a shift in the U.S. import strategy  and what proportion is due to a
shift in the Soviet export marketing strategy.  This model allows us to
exogenously determine the import coefficient for each bloc and to derive
the export coefficients (exports  to each bloc as a percentage of total
exports by each bloc).  Import sourcing strategies are being set explicitly
whereas export market strategies  are being set implicitly.
C.  The Model
12.  These three sets of instrument  variables --  GDP growth rates,
imports as a share of GDP and import coefficients --  generate a new matrix
of imports and exports in 1995 and a new set of import and export
coefficients, or to put it in a more interesting  way, a new structure of
world trade.  The principal endogenous variable is exports.  Summing across
the rows of the 1995 trade matrix yields total exports in 1995 for each
bloc which divided by the projected 1995 GDP gives us the induced export-
GDP share in 1995.
13.  Algebraically, the model is as follows:
y1980  =  _  y1980$  (gIY
1995(j)  1985(j)  x  1985-1995(j)
m  1980$  yl980$  M/Y *
1995(j)  1995(j)  x(  )1995(j)
Where:  Y is GDP for each country or bloc (j),  the subscript is the year
and the superscript is the currency in which the variable is  measured.APPENDIX
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M  is imports (goods  and nonfactor services)
M/Y  is the import-GDP share, imports as a percent of GDP
aY/Y  is the real average annual growth rate of GDP
*  indicates an exogenous or projected variable
These data are all taken from or based on the  Andrex data system of the
World Bank.
14.  The United Nations Trade Matrix for 1985 has been reconfigured to
correspond to the fifteen  blocs specified in our trade  model with an
additional bloc for the rest of the world.  This matrix consists of M 1js
and X.  s where
Xij  =  imports by country j from country i where i represents
the rows and j the columns of the matrix;
X=j  . exports by country i to country J.
15.  Therefore, for any given set of importing (j)  and exporting (i)
blocs:
Xij  =  M;;  by definition the exports of country i  to country j
equal the imports  of country j  from country i.
16
E Mj=  MJtot  The sum of the M, 1s in each column
i=l  equals the total imports of each
importing  country of bloc (J).
16  16
E  Mj-  E  X. =  X  tot  The sum of the  M;.s  in each row equals
j=l  j=l  the total exports of each exporting
c;ountry  or bloc (i).APPENDIX
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Then:
=  (ma]  The  vector  of  M-s in  each  column  divided
(mJitJ  by the  vector  of corresponding  total  imports
generates  a  matrix  of import  coefficients  of
mNjs  where
m 1J  =  the  imports  by  bloc  j  from  bloc  i as a percentage  of
total  imports  by bloc  j.
Similarlyt
(X;J]
=  lx;;]  The  vector  of  X.-s  in  each  row  divided  by
(X;t]  the  vector  of corresponding  total  exports
generates  a  muarix  of export  coefficients  of
xsjs  where
x  =j  the  exports  of bloc  i to  bloc  J as  a percentage  of total
exports  by  bloc  i.
16.  The  matrix  of import  coefficients  for  the  16 blocs  for  1985  or
some  exogenously  determined  variant  of it (*)  is  joined  with the  import
vector  for  1995  to  generate  a new  trade  matrix  of imports  and  exports  in
1995,  as follows:
[1tot  11980$  x  m11985*  =  M11980$  EX  1980$
. 1995  ij1  ij995  E  Xii]  1995
17.  Because  the  relative  growth  rates  of the  16  blocs  are  different
from  each  other  and  the  import-GDP  shares  have  changed  from  1985,  the
matrix  of induced  exports  is  going  to  be different  in structure  (i.e.
[xC;]leo5  is  going  to be different  from [x1j]1 9,,)  even  if  we do not  change
the  matrix  of import  coefficients  [m,,]l9.
18.  Induced  exports  in 1995  are  the  endogenous  variable  of primary
interest  in this  model. The  incremental  change  in  exports  over  the  tenAPPENDIX
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years.  the  rate  of growth  of exports  between  1985  and  1995,  and  the  export-
GDP share  in 1995  are  all  of major  consequence.
x1980S  x1980S  x1980S  incremental.
X1985-1995(i)  X1995(i)  1985(i)  exports
X1980$
X1995(i)  r  1  rate  of growth
10  x1980$  x(i)  of exports
1985(i)
x1980$  1l980$  export-GDP X1995(i:  y1995S  share
19.  If the  induced  export-GDP  share  overshoots  the  target  export-GDP
share,  several  possibilities  exist. One  is  that  the  combination  of growth
rates,  import  share  changes  and  shifts  in import  coefficients  of the  trade
partners  of the  overshooting  bloc  are  more  powerful  than  anticipated  in
generating  exports. Hence,  some  downward  adjustment  is  necessary  in  the
instrument  variables  of the  trade  partners  or some  upward  adjustment  in the
GDP  growth  of the  overshooting  bloc  must  be made  to account  for  the
stimulus  to  growth  of the  incremental  demand  for  its  exports. This  latter
adjustment  would  appropriately  drive  down  the  export-CDP  share  by
increasing  the  GDP  of the  overshooting  country. Conversely,  a smaller  than
anticipated  export-GDP  share  implies  that  world  economy  as  postulated  in
that  scenario  is  not  structured  in such  a  way  as to be able  to generate  the
level  of exports  anticipated  or  pari  passu  that  the  rate  of growth  of  GDP
projected  for  the  undershooting  bloc is  too  high to  be consistent  with the
projected  dynamics  and  needs  to be adjusted  downward. These  examplesAPPENDIX
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illustrate  one  of the  ways in  which  the  model  is a closed  circuit  providing
a consistency  check  on the  results.
20.  A second  check  is  the  potential  spillover  of exports  to the  'rest
of the  world". In exogenously  reconf'guring  the  import  coefficients,  the
share  of imports  from  the  rest  of the  world  has  been  held  constant  so that
all  the  change  in  the  structure  of imports  occurs  within  the  fifteen  blocs.
On the  other  hand,  since  the  export  projections  are  induced,  the  percentage
of exports  to  the rest  of the  world  in 1995  may exceed  or fall  short  of
that  percentage  in 1985. Since  this  is  a residual  term,  if  the  1995  export
share  to the  rest  of the  world  exceeds  the  3.985  share  for  a given  bloc,  the
combination  of growth  rates,  openness  to imports  and  import  strategies  of
its  trade  partners  are  not  sufficient  to induce  the  same  share  of  bloc
exports  to the  other  fifteen  as in  1985. Conversely,  if the  1995  export
share  of a given  bloc to  the  rest  of the  world  falls  short  of the  1985
share,  it implies  that  growth,  openness,  and  import  strategy  assumptions  of
its  trade  partners  have  been  overspecified  and  need to  be  more  modest  to  be
consistent.
21.  Finally,  attached  to the  model  is  a  method  of  decomposing  the
export  results  by bloc  to each  bloc  according  to the  proportion  of
incremental  exports  in  each  cell  of the  matrix  in 1995  generated  by (a)  the
GDP  growth  rate  of each  importing  country,  (b)  changes  in  the  import  share
of each  importing  country,  and (c)  changes  in  the  import  coefficient  of
each  country. This  provides  a trace  on the  results  to enable  us to locate
the  existence  of disproportionate  contributions  to them  once  the  other  twoAPPENDIX
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consistency  checks  have  highlighted  a  problem. This  methodology  also
provides  an average  for  each  exporting  country  of the  c-  rT'bution  of  each
of the  three  exogenous  variables  to the  total  incremental  exports  between
1985  and  1995.
22.  The  result  of this  relatively  simple  and  transparent  modelling  is
a computer  program  with  over  660,000  data  bytes. The  decomposition  tracing
exercise  itself  is 15  exporting  blocs  times  15 importing  blocs  times  3
exogenous  variables  which  yields  675  indicators  to examine. Nonetheless,
it  is  not  an overwhelming  task  to  use  this  model  to simulate  scenarios  with
relatively  few  general  policy  inputs. Alternative  results  can  be examined
comparatively,  following  in  a rather  straightforward  way from  alternative
sets  of  macroeconomic  and  trade  strategies  which  taken  together  constitute
different  global  strategies.PRE  Working  Papgr  Serles
Contact
IlE  AtdhA  r  DLD  forpaper
WPS360  Compounding  Financial  Repression  Bertrand  Renaud  January  1990  L. Vitorio
with Rigid  Urban  Regulations:  Lessons  31009
of the Korea  Housing  Market
WPS361  Housing  and  Labor  Market  Stephen  K. Mayo  January  1990  L. Victorio
Distortions  in Poland: Linkages  James  I. Stein  h1Uu9
and Policy Implicatlons
WPS362  Urban  Property  1  axation: Lessons  Wlliam Dillinger  January  1990  L. Victorto
from Brazil  31009
WPS363  Paying  for Urban  Services: A Study  Dale  Whitington  January  1990  L. Victorio
of Water  Vending  and Willingness  Donald  T. Lauria  31009
to Pay  for Water  in Onitsha,  Nigeria  Xinming  Mu
WPS364 Financing  Urban  Services  in Latin  Gian  Carlo  Guarda  January  1990  L. Victorbo
America: Spatial  Distribution  Issues  31009
WPS365 Cost and Benefits  of Rent Control  Stephen  Malpezzi  January  1990  L  Victorio
in Kumasi,  Ghana  A.  Graham  Tipple  31009
Kenneth  G. Willis
WPS366  Inflation,  Monetary  Balances,  and  Robert Buckley  January  1990  L. Victorbo
the Aggregate  Production  Function:  Anupam  Dokeniya  31009
The Case  of Colombia
WPS367 The Response  of Japanese  and  U.S. Panos  Varangis  March  1990  D. Gustafson
Steel Prices  to Changes  in the  Ronald  C. Duncan  33714
Yen-Dollar  Exchange  Rate
WPS368  Enterprise  Reform  in Socialist  Guttorm  Schjelderup
Economies:  Lease  Contracts  Viewed
as a Principal-Agent  Problem
WPS369 Cost Recovery  Strategy  for  Dale  Whittington  March  1990  V. David
Rural  Water  Delivery  in Nigeria  Apia Okorafor  33736
Augustine  Akore
Alexander  McPhail
WPS370  Export  Incentives,  Exchange  Rate  Ismail  Arslan
Policy,  and Export  Growth  in Turkey Sweder  van Wijnbergen
WPS371 Tariff Valuation  Bases  and  Trade  Refk  Erzan  February  1990  J. Epps
Among  Developing  Cournties  ...  Alexander  Yeats  33710
Do Developing  Countries  Discriminate
Against  Their  Own  Trade?
WPS372 Long-Term  Outlook  for the World  Shahrokh  Fardoust  February  1990  J. Queen
Economy: Issues  and Projections  Ashok  Dhareshwar  33740
for the 1990sContact
iwa  AtAhor  DAMor  rpapgar
WPS373  Are Better-off  Households  More  Lawrence  Haddad  March  1990  J. Sweeney
Unequal  or Less Unequal?  Ravi  Kanbur  31021
WPS374  Two Sources  of Bias in Standard  Samuel  Laird  February  1990  J. Epps
Partial  Equilibrium  Trads  Models  Alexander  J. Yeats  33710
WPS375  Regional  Disparities,  Targeting,  and  Gaurav  Dat  March  1990  C. Spooner
Poverty  in India  Martin  Ravallion  30464
WPS376  The  World Economy  in the  Colin 1.  Bradford,  Jr.  March  1990  C. Evangelista
Mid-I  990s: Alternative  Patterns  of  32645
Trade and Growth
WPS377  Security  for Development  In a  John Stremlau
Post-Bipolar  World
WPS378  How Does  the Debt Crisis Affect  Patricio  Arrau
Investment  and  Growth? A Neoclassi-
cal Growth  Model  Applied  to Mexico
WPS379  Some  Implications  of Policy  Games  Miguel  A. Kiguel  March  1990  R. Luz
for High Inflation  Economies  Nissan  LMvatan  39059
WPS380  Techniques  for Railway  Lee  W. Huff  March  1990  S. Shive
Restructuring  Louis  S. Thompson  33761
WPS381  Trade  in Banking  Services:  Alan  Gelb  March  1990  W. Pitayatona-
Issues  for Multilateral  Negotiations  Silvia  Sagari  kam
37666
WPS382  The Indonesian  Vegetable  Oils  Donald  F. Larson  March  1990  D. Gustafson
Sector: Modeling  the Impact  of  33714
Policy  Changes
WPS383  On  the Relevance  of World  Yair Mundlak  March  1990  D. Gustafson
Agricultural  Prices  Donald  F. Larson  33714
WPS384 A Review  of the Use  of the Rational  Christopher  L. Gilbert
Expectations: Hypothesis  in Models
of Primary  Commodity  Prices
WPS385  The Principles  of Targeting  Timothy  Besley  March  1990  J. Sweeney
Ravi  Kanbur  31021
WPS386  Argentina's  Labor  Markets  in an Era  Luws  A. Riveros  March  1990  R. Luz
of Adjustment  Carlos  E.  Sanchez  39059
WPS387  Productivity  and Externalities:  Jaime  de Melo  March  1990  M. Ameal
Models  of Export-Led  Growth  Sherman  Robinson  37947